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The literature on journalism ethics and law contains no generally shared defi ni-
tion of what constitutes the public interest. The goal of this article is to establish 
the positions on the public interest taken by three courts – that is, the European 
Court of Human Rights, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia, 
and the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia – in order to discern 
whether case law has provided more specifi c guidelines for understanding what 
journalism in the public interest actually means. Based on our analysis, we pro-
pose a broad defi nition whereby information in the public interest refers to data 
so objectively important to society that the public’s right to be informed about 
such data outweighs a human right or freedom, or a private or public interest, 
which would otherwise demand that the data not be disclosed to the public. In-
formation in the public interest can be part of political, economic, social, reli-
gious, or any other contexts. The essence of the public interest is that it concerns 
an important matter, the importance of which can only be evaluated on a case-
by-case basis, taking into account all of the circumstances of a particular case.
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Introduction
There is no generally shared defi nition of what constitutes the public interest, de-
spite it being “the most important question in journalism today” (Harding, 2012) 
and “commonly presumed to be fundamental to the practice of journalism” (Morton 
& Aroney, 2016: 20). Muller (2014: 53) described it as one of the four key recurring 
concepts in ethical decision-making for journalism, alongside free speech, the 
avoidance-of-harm principle, and censorship. This highlights the need for exploring 
the idea of public interest in journalism in more detail.
Despite lacking a clear defi nition, the term ‘in the public interest’ is well established 
among both professionals and scholars in journalism ethics and law. According to 
Franklin et al. (2005: 211), this term is used in both legal and media contexts of eth-
ics, communications policies, and social responsibility. It denotes “specifi c criteria 
by which the usual legal rights of an individual or organisation, e.g. to defend their 
reputation, or protect confi dential matters, privacy or copyright, are justifi ably over-
ridden by the need for information to be published to benefi t society, e.g. to help it 
understand events or scrutinize people in the public eye” (ibid.). The academic lit-
erature mostly deals with the public interest in relation to privacy rights (e.g. Mor-
rison & Svennevig, 2007; Whittle & Cooper, 2009; Rusbridger, 2014; Wragg, 2015; 
Burns Coleman & Eastgate Dann, 2016). However, this issue is also relevant in 
cases involving other rights, such as personal dignity or source confi dentiality, 
which can collide with freedom of expression. In order to avoid unjustifi able viola-
tions, limits must be determined by considering the public interest.
Since identifying public interests and acting accordingly is a very signifi cant part of 
journalists’ work, some authors (e.g. Davies, 2009) have argued the need for a more 
precise defi nition. According to Harding (2012), for example, such a defi nition 
“must provide an overarching rationale as well as being of practical use”. Cathcart 
(2011) stated that, although no defi nition can bring “absolute clarity for all journal-
ists in all circumstances”, we can develop “a workable one in most circumstances”. 
In this article, we will discuss the possibilities for creating such a defi nition. Our 
goal is to examine whether defi nitions from the literature on journalism ethics and 
law could benefi t from public interest interpretations established in case law. The 
position of three select courts on the issue of public interest in judgements related to 
freedom of expression will be compared to defi nitions from the literature in order to 
discern whether case law has provided more specifi c guidelines for understanding 
what journalism in the public interest actually means.
Literature Review
The roots of the public interest concept can be traced through social contract theo-
ries, particularly through the work of Hobbes, Rousseau, Dewey, and Lippmann (for 
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a detailed review, see Stoker & Stoker, 2012). In political philosophy, public interest 
has been used over the centuries “to denote some type of commonality or common 
characteristic between and among citizens” (King et al., 2010: 957). For example, 
Lippmann (1955) believed that living adults share the same public interest, which is 
both mixed with and at odds with their private interests. Accordingly, “the public 
interest may be presumed to be what men would choose if they saw clearly, thought 
rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently” (Lippmann, 1955: 44). When de-
fi ning the public interest, one needs to consider the semantic dimensions of public-
ness in relation to the public-private dichotomy, as described by Splichal (1999: 
17–20). Public can refer to what is visible or accessible to everyone, or at least to 
many. Public, in the sense of referring to matters of general or national (state) im-
portance or interest, has to do with common or general interests that should be satis-
fi ed by public actions. In this sense, public refers to the sphere of institutionalised 
political power, a sovereign state, contrary to the economy and personal relations, 
which are outside of state control and belong to the private sphere. The third mean-
ing of public derives from Dewey’s conceptualisation, in which the difference be-
tween private and public is not the same as the difference between the individual 
and social or socially useful. It is instead based on the consequences of an individ-
ual’s action for individuals who are not directly involved in a transaction. If the 
consequences of human actions are confi ned to the individuals directly participating 
in them, the transactions are considered private; if indirect consequences are recog-
nised and somehow regulated, the transactions are public in nature.
In the literature, the public interest seems to be discussed most often by emphasising 
the need for distinguishing the public interest from what interests the public. Ac-
cording to the former Guardian readers’ editor, Chris Elliott (2012), the public inter-
est is by no means synonymous with whatever interests the public. Harding (2012) 
stressed that the public interest “does not mean just satisfying the curiosity of the 
public”. Muller (2014: 62) claimed that the public interest “is not the same as public 
curiosity, nor is it assessed by whether a story increases newspaper circulations or 
generates high levels of online clicks”. Davies (2009) pointed out the need “to draw 
a distinction between ‘public curiosity’ and ‘social or civic importance’”. Hill and 
Lashmar (2014: 129) wrote that the public interest “is not the same as what interests 
the public”. Although both terms—public interest and the interest of the public—in-
clude the word ‘interest’, their meanings are distinct from one another: “In one we 
give our attention to something because it has the potential to do us good or harm; 
in the other we are merely curious” (Cathcart, 2011).
If we summarised the defi nitions from different scholars and professionals, their 
common element would be equating the public interest with information that has 
relevance for the public. According to Hill and Lashmar (2014: 129), the public in-
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terest is “important information that should be available to the public to help them 
make informed decisions in a democratic society”. Similarly, Wilson (1996: 32) 
stated that the public interest “refers to serious matters in which the public have or 
ought to have a legitimate interest”. Morrison and Svennevig (2007: 63) even pro-
posed a new concept—‘social importance’—as a test of public interest, which 
would allow journalists to avoid confusion regarding the difference between what 
the public is interested in and what is in the public’s interest.
Muller (2014: 64) comprehensively listed indicators of public interest, namely: the 
existence of crime or serious corruption or impropriety in public life; the existence 
of a threat to public health or safety; the existence of a fraud or scam that is likely to 
mislead or rob the public; exposure of hypocrisy or double standards in public life; 
and betrayal of public trust in something in which the public has a substantial com-
mercial or emotional investment. To summarise, the public interest concerns “mat-
ters that affect public health, safety, or fi nancial security; the capacity of citizens to 
participate in civic life; or the conduct of affairs in which the public have invested 
trust” (Muller, 2014: 65). Moosavian (2014: 244–248) classifi ed the public interest 
as that which contributes to democratic debate, prevents the public from being mis-
led, or reveals crimes or serious misdeeds. These are merely examples of typical 
themes, which are usually by virtue of their content so important to the public that 
journalists have a wide margin of freedom of expression when reporting on them.
Several authors have attempted to defi ne the public interest as an argument in cases 
of privacy invasion. Burns Coleman and Eastgate Dann (2016: 67), for example, 
argued that invasions of privacy should serve the public interest, which is not “the 
interest of an individual, or a particular group, but an interest that all citizens share, 
such as their interest in justice, safety, health or good governance”. Gillespie (2016) 
wrote that public interest journalism encompasses correcting a signifi cant wrong, 
bringing to light information that affects public well-being and safety, or seeking 
greater accountability and transparency in public life. Whittle and Cooper (2009: 
97–98) defi ned the following characteristics of public interest: citizens in a demo-
cratic state have an interest in having access to information about the workings of 
the state’s institutions, as well as private companies and voluntary organisations that 
require the public’s trust; when an individual holds such an offi ce, it is in the public 
interest that his/her public actions be open for inspection, analysis, and investigation 
by the news media; such an individual is to be judged for his/her public and not 
private acts; and if links are shown to exist between public and private, then the lat-
ter is a legitimate area of inquiry.
The idea of journalists serving the public interest is “closely linked to ideas of the 
social responsibility of news media” (Rodny-Gumede, 2015: 112), and is therefore 
of central importance for ethical journalism. The fundamental principle of journal-
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ism ethics is journalists’ moral commitment to maximally relevant truth-telling in 
the public interest and for the public good, according to Jacquette (2012: 214). Since 
the primary purpose of journalism ethics codes is “safeguarding the autonomy of 
the profession and serving the public interest” (Baydar, 2008: 21), it can be assumed 
that a clearer defi nition of the public interest can be found within them. Journalism 
codes of conduct generally recognise that in some circumstances, “there must be 
public interest exceptions to ethical norms of news-gathering and of what should be 
published” (Franklin et al., 2005: 211). A review of several randomly selected codes 
or guidelines revealed that some explicitly refer to the public interest, but without 
explaining its meaning. For example, this was the case in codes from Finland (Coun-
cil for Mass Media, 2014), the Netherlands (Raad voor de Journalistiek, 2015), 
Sweden (Pressens Samarbetsnämnd, 2001), Denmark (The Press Council, 2013), 
Germany (German Press Council, 2015), Slovenia (DNS & SNS, 2010), and Croa-
tia (HND, 2009). Conversely, some media organisations (e.g. BBC, The Guardian) 
and professional organisations (e.g. IPSO from the UK, The Press Council of South 
Africa, The Press Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Austrian Press Council, 
New Zealand Press Council) adopted codes that at least somewhat thoroughly de-
fi ne how the public interest is to be understood.
A rather detailed defi nition has been created by the British Independent Press Stand-
ards Organisation (IPSO, 2016), stating that the public interest includes, but is not 
confi ned to: detecting or exposing crime, the threat of crime, or serious impropriety; 
protecting public health or safety; protecting the public from being misled by an 
action or statement of an individual or organisation; disclosing a person or organisa-
tion’s failure or likely failure to comply with any obligation to which they are sub-
ject; disclosing a miscarriage of justice; raising or contributing to a matter of public 
debate, including serious cases of impropriety, unethical conduct, or incompetence 
concerning the public; and disclosing concealment, or likely concealment, of any of 
the above. A very similar defi nition has been presented by the BBC Editorial Guide-
lines, which states that the public interest includes, but is not confi ned to: exposing 
or detecting crime; exposing signifi cantly anti-social behaviour; exposing corrup-
tion or injustice; disclosing signifi cant incompetence or negligence; protecting peo-
ple’s health and safety; preventing people from being misled by some statement or 
action of an individual or organisation; and disclosing information that assists peo-
ple in better comprehending or making decisions on matters of public importance.
Some codes drafted shorter defi nitions. For example, the Press Council in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (2011) defi ned the public interest “as the procedure and/or infor-
mation which has the intention of helping the public create personal opinions and 
decisions about issues and events, including the efforts to detect criminal and/or 
civil offenses, and to prevent the seduction of the public by certain statements 
or actions of individuals or organizations”. The Austrian Press Council (Der 
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Ö sterreichische Presserat, 2013) referred to “situations of investigating serious 
crime, protecting public health or safety, or preventing the public from being mis-
led”. Some professional organisations preferred more general defi nitions. The Press 
Council of South Africa (2016), for example, described the public interest as “infor-
mation of legitimate interest or importance to citizens” (The Press Council of South 
Africa, 2016). The New Zealand Press Council also gave a defi nition that left room 
for different interpretations, defi ning the public interest “as involving a matter capa-
ble of affecting the people at large so that they might be legitimately interested in, 
or concerned about, what is going on, or what may happen to them or to others”.
Methodology
Reviewing journalism ethics and law literature, as well as several journalism ethics 
codes, revealed that, despite its relevance for journalism, there is no strict universal 
defi nition of the term ‘public interest’. However, we expect that case law has more 
specifi cally defi ned the public interest as the circumstances determining the limits 
of freedom of expression. Therefore, our goal is to establish the position on the 
public interest issue taken by three select courts, that is, the European Court of Hu-
man Rights (ECtHR), the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia (CCRS), 
and the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia (CCRC).
The ECtHR’s judgements were chosen because the ECtHR is “an international con-
stitutional court with the power of in concreto judicial review and with the de facto 
erga omnes effect of its judgements” (Zupančič, 2006: 170). According to Ribičič 
(2010: 116), the European Convention on Human Rights is not only what has been 
written in it, but also what the ECtHR has read in it and added to it in any of its 
decisions on the convention’s merits. In this way, the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights is a “living instrument” (Wedam Lukić, 2010: 1039) that continuously 
develops through the case-law of the ECtHR; accordingly, national courts must ap-
ply the ECtHR’s case-law when interpreting the contents of particular conventional 
rights. The judgments of constitutional courts are nationally relevant because one of 
their functions is “the function of the substitute ‘Constitution-maker’”, which means 
that in specifi c cases, these courts “even supplement constitutional provisions” 
(Mavčič, 2009: 34). The Constitution “is changing” with almost every decision of 
the Constitutional court, which provides its interpretation of the Constitution when 
dealing with complex constitutional issues (Ribičič, 2010: 35).
We will address three research questions:
RQ 1: How is the public interest interpreted in the case law of the ECtHR?
RQ 2: How is the public interest interpreted in the case law of the CCRS?
RQ 3: How is the public interest interpreted in the case law of the CCRC?
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We will use the qualitative method of document analysis to answer these questions 
(e.g. Bowen, 2009). What that means is we will analyse relevant judgements of the 
three courts dealing with cases concerning freedom of expression, as well as legal 
acts that serve as the basis for the courts’ decisions. Judgments of the ECtHR refer 
to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, judgements of the 
CCRS to Article 39 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, and judgements 
of the CCRC to Articles 38(1) and 38(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Croatia. Due to space limitations, only a few case studies will be presented in the 
following chapter.
Results and Discussion: Matters in the Public Interest
Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights
The notion of a public interest in the context of the right to freedom of expression is 
not explicitly defi ned in the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the 
ECtHR has repeatedly stated in its judgments that freedom of expression is one of 
the most important human rights. According to the ECtHR, this human right consti-
tutes one of “the essential foundations of a democratic society, one of the basic 
conditions for its progress and for the development of every man”.3 Despite this 
principled position, according to which freedom of expression is paramount in the 
hierarchy of human rights, its scope in each case depends on many factors and cir-
cumstances. The most important circumstance is whether the disputed statement 
was made in the context of the public interest. Debate on matters related to the 
public interest must be free and should only be limited in exceptional cases.4 In the 
context of such topics, the participants in these discussions may express their ideas 
in particularly sharp and provocative terms.5
This context necessitates distinguishing between a matter in the public interest and 
a matter of the public interest. The necessity of distinguishing between these two 
matters was raised by the ECtHR in Von Hannover v. Germany.6 It addressed an ap-
plication by Caroline von Hannover (the applicant), who lost the litigation in the 
German courts against the media, which had published photos of her private life. 
German courts took the position that the applicant was an absolute public person 
whose privacy stopped at her front door.7 According to the German courts, since the 
controversial photos were taken in public places, the media’s publication of these 
photos did not intolerably affect the applicant’s right to privacy. Based on this, pub-
lishing the photos in question legitimately exercises the public’s right to be in-
formed. However, the ECtHR upheld the complaint by Caroline von Hannover and 
condemned Germany for breaching the applicant’s peaceful private and family life. 
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The ECtHR held that the German courts wrongly assessed that the publication of the 
applicant’s photos was in the public interest due to her status. Namely, there should 
be a distinction between facts that are objectively and broadly relevant to society 
and those with the sole purpose of satisfying the curiosity of a particular readership. 
Media coverage of the fi rst—i.e. facts in the public interest—must be as unrestricted 
as possible. However, reporting on intimate events in the lives of famous persons, 
which serves only to profi t the media, is afforded a much narrower protection of 
freedom of expression. In this case, the ECtHR thus defi ned the criteria for the dis-
tinction between matters that lie within the public interest and matters that merely 
serve to entertain the masses. The objective element is decisive. For defi ning mat-
ters in the public interest, it is not important whether this matter interests the public; 
what is essential is that it is objectively and broadly important to society.
Moreover, many different cases that are objectively important to society can be 
found in ECtHR case law; typically, these are matters with political content. Ac-
cording to the ECtHR, free political debate and free elections are the cornerstones 
of any democratic system.8 Therefore, there is a wide margin for freedom of expres-
sion in the context of a political debate, which means that the parties can express 
themselves in such a debate in a particularly sharp and provocative manner.
An example of restrictions on freedom of expression in the context of political de-
bate was considered by the ECtHR in the case Lombardo v. Malta.9 City councillors 
in a Maltese town, in connection with the construction of a local road, published a 
newspaper article accusing the city council of ignoring public opinion on the issue. 
Maltese courts found the assertions by the councillors to be offensive, and thus an 
abuse of freedom of expression; therefore, they convicted the councillors of defa-
mation. The ECtHR declared the application admissible and convicted Malta for 
violating freedom of expression. In its judgment, inter alia, the ECtHR stated that 
the applicants’ statements were given within the context of an open political debate 
on a matter in the public interest, and that such a debate should especially be unre-
stricted. Therefore, by convicting the applicants, the Maltese courts excessively re-
stricted their right to freedom of expression.
The ECtHR further emphasised the necessity of unrestricted freedom of expression 
in the context of political debate in the cases of Oberschlick v. Austria10 and Ober-
schlick v. Austria (2).11 In the fi rst case, journalist Gerhard Oberschlick published in 
the newspaper Forum a criminal complaint that he had fi led against an Austrian 
politician. The politician was advocating reducing family allowances for women 
immigrants in Austria and simultaneously for increasing those received by Austrian 
women. Austrian courts considered the criminal complaint’s publication to be an 
abuse of freedom of expression and condemned Oberschlick for defamation. In the 
courts’ view, Oberschlick wrongly associated the politician’s statement with Nazi 
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ideas, while at the same time expressing contempt for the politician in his article. 
The ECtHR heard the journalist’s appeal and in its judgment, inter alia, stated that 
it is necessary to criticise the politician’s conduct; therefore, in the context of po-
litical debate, sharp and provocative statements are permissible. Freedom of expres-
sion in the context of political debate may only be restricted in exceptional cases.
The court even went a step further in protecting freedom of expression in the con-
text of political debate in the case of Oberschlick v. Austria (2). This dealt with a 
case in which the then governor of Carinthia, Jörg Haider, at a ceremony, inter alia, 
stated that we had to thank both Nazi and Allied soldiers, since both fought for our 
freedom. Journalist Oberschlick commented on Haider’s appearance in an article in 
which, inter alia, he labelled Haider as an idiot. Because of these words, he was 
sentenced by Austrian courts; however, the ECtHR allowed his appeal. One of the 
decisive reasons for the ECtHR’s position, which held that Oberschlick’s words 
were within the permissible limits of freedom of expression, was that the criticism 
of Haider had been expressed in the context of a political debate.
A typical example of a matter in the public interest is misuse of power on the part of 
public offi cials. In the case of Thorgeirson v. Iceland,12 writer Thorgeirson pub-
lished two articles criticising alleged violent conduct by the Reykjavík police. Po-
lice offi cers were described with sharp expressions, such as “beasts in uniform”. At 
the police union’s insistence, the public prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings 
against Thorgeirson for defamation. The evidence showed that Thorgeirson simply 
invented a part of the allegations in the article, which he wrote primarily on the 
basis of unsubstantiated rumours, so Icelandic courts found him to be guilty. How-
ever, the ECtHR allowed Thorgeirson’s appeal. The main reason for the ECtHR’s 
decision was that Thorgeirson wrote on a matter in the public interest—i.e. the al-
leged abuse of police powers. According to the ECtHR, in the context of such a 
debate, the journalist may also report on the basis of rumours and without suffi cient 
basis in fact.
In the case of Giniewski v. France,13 writer Giniewski published an article blaming 
Catholic Church doctrines for anti-Semitism in society. Because of these words, he 
was sentenced by French courts for defamation of members of the Christian com-
munity. However, the ECtHR condemned France for infringing on the writer’s free-
dom of expression, stating that in the context of a subject as important as the search 
for the cause of the Holocaust, the greatest tragedy of modern times, sharp and even 
offensive expressions should be allowed.
Let us conclude the review of the ECtHR case law in relation to matters in the pub-
lic interest with the case of Editions Plon v France.14 The ECtHR ruled on a case in 
which former French President Mitterrand’s physician published a book describing 
the last days before the death of his patient. The French authorities banned the sale 
34
Medij. istraž. (god. 23, br. 1) 2017. (25-46)
of the book, since it was alleged to interfere with respecting the president’s relatives. 
However, the ECtHR held that such a restriction on freedom of expression was too 
strict. The main reason for the ECtHR’s position was that the subject of a head of 
state’s illness and the question of whether he was able to carry out his work while ill 
was a matter of public interest.15
On the basis of the presented cases, one can conclude that any matter can be consid-
ered to be in the public interest as long as it is objectively important to the public. 
This can be a debate on the construction of a road, which is important for a local 
population, or a debate on a reactionary politician’s ideas, for whom the public 
voted in an election. It can also be a debate on the misuse of power on the part of 
public offi cials, an investigation of the causes of the Holocaust, or about the illness 
of the president of the country. The public has the right to be informed about all of 
these facts, and it is essential that everyone be enabled to express their opinions. 
Discussing matters in the public interest should only very rarely be restricted due to 
its great importance for a free and democratic society.
Case Law of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia
Public interest is not defi ned in the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (see 
Ustava Republike Slovenije). However, it is mentioned in the Slovenian legislation, 
i.e. the Public Information Access Act (see Zakon o dostopu do informacij javnega 
značaja). Article 6(1) of the Act specifi es the information to which an applicant does 
not have access, and Article 6(2) defi nes the so-called ‘public interest test’. On the 
basis of the latter, access to the requested information may be permitted, even if the 
information falls within the defi nition provided in Article 6(1), if the public interest 
in the disclosure of such information prevails over the public interest or the interest 
of other persons by restricting access to said information.16
Although the CCRS case law is much more modest than the ECtHR’s case law on 
this topic, CCRS’s decisions demonstrate that it understands matters in the public 
interest very similarly to the ECtHR. Let us present some examples confi rming this.
In the case of Up-2940/07,17 the police announced at a press conference that some 
police offi cers were suspected of committed several offenses. The police gave jour-
nalists only the initials of the suspected police offi cers’ names. However, the daily 
Delo published an article revealing the identity of a suspected police offi cer. The 
police offi cer fi led an action against the newspaper’s publisher, and he was success-
ful in the ordinary courts. According to the regular court’s opinions, the newspaper 
should not have disclosed the identity of a person against whom criminal proceed-
ings had not yet even been initiated, let alone convicted. However, the CCRS ruled 
in favour of the daily because the subject of public offi cials’ abuse of powers is a 
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matter of public interest, the framework of which should allow for a wide margin of 
freedom of expression.
Another matter in the public interest is the subject of infl uential business lobbies. In 
the case of Up-570/09,18 the daily Večer published an article stating that a known 
Carinthian entrepreneur (who was identifi ed by his full name in the article) was 
suspected of money laundering, which he had allegedly committed in collaboration 
with some bank offi cials. The entrepreneur brought an action against the newspaper 
for wrongful interference with his right to privacy. The regular court upheld his 
claim, but the CCRS sided with the newspaper. In the decision upholding the con-
stitutional complaint, the CCRS held that the public had a right to be informed about 
infl uential economic networks involving entrepreneurs and banks.
In the case of Up-139/02,19 the CCRS decided that a controversial fundraising from 
a legal perspective for members’ mutual support is a matter in the public interest 
with respect to what critical media coverage is permissible. According to the CCRS, 
even in the event of a pointed and provocative media report, unlawfulness is ex-
cluded if it is a criticism carried out in the public interest or if it is in the legitimate 
interest of the public to be informed about a particular action or event.
In the case of Up-1128/12,20 the CCRS dealt with a case in which a regular court had 
sentenced a former member of Parliament for insulting the public prosecutor by 
saying that “he would not entrust him to take care after three sheep, because he 
would be afraid that the two of them would be lost and that he did not know how this 
man fi nished law school, but as it appears the law school nowadays could be fi n-
ished by anyone, who could then get a job at a court or an offi ce of the prosecutor 
and is then cemented to death there and nobody could move him, even if he does 
such stupid things”. The CCRS repealed the convictions, inter alia, because the 
words of the Parliament member were spoken in the context of a discussion on a 
matter in the public interest—i.e. criticising the work of public prosecutors. The 
CCRS emphasised that the public has the right to be informed in detail about the 
work of public prosecutors, and the latter must endure critical and unpleasant words 
on their account.
There is only one case in CCRS case law that confl icted with the standards set out 
in the ECtHR case law when defi ning the concept of public interest in informing the 
public. The case of Up-1391/0721 dealt with a situation in which a Parliament mem-
ber, Srečko Prijatelj, had been criticised by a journalist working for Mladina maga-
zine. In his speech before Parliament, Prijatelj made fun of homosexuals, which was 
the subject of a severe critique by Mladina’s journalist. Among other things, the 
journalist called him “a cerebral bankrupt”. Prijatelj brought an action against 
Mladina for defamation; he was successful before the ordinary courts, and even the 
CCRS ruled in his favour. Mladina instituted proceedings before the ECtHR, which, 
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for the fi rst and only time so far, found Slovenia to be in breach of freedom of ex-
pression.22 The ECtHR held that Slovenian courts excessively restricted the right to 
freedom of expression because they disregarded fact that the journalist’s words had 
been written in the context of a political debate, i.e. to criticise the wrongful conduct 
of the representative of authority.23
From the above cases, it is evident that the CCRS usually understands matters in the 
public interest similarly to the ECtHR, namely, as matters that are objectively im-
portant for the public and within which a wide margin of freedom of expression is 
permitted. The CCRS’s misunderstanding of a matter in the public interest in the 
Mladina case led to the fi rst conviction of Slovenia by the ECtHR for violation of 
freedom of expression.
Case Law of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia
Public interest is not defi ned in the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (see 
Ustav Republike Hrvatske). The right of access to information is regulated by Croa-
tian law. Thus, Article 16 of the Croatian Right to Access to Information Act (see 
Zakon o pravu na pristup informacijama) defi nes the “proportionality and public 
interest test”, on the basis of which the authorities must assess whether the applicant 
is allowed to be familiar with specifi c information to which the public is not other-
wise entitled. For this purpose, and in line with this provision, it is necessary to 
weigh the confl icting interests: on the one hand, public interest in the disclosure of 
information, and on the other hand, the interest of other persons in ensuring that 
such information is not disclosed.
Our analysis of the CCRC case law was limited by the relatively small number of 
available judgements. Namely, on the CCRC’s website, we found eight decisions by 
the CCRC relating to Articles 38(1) and 38(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Croatia,24 and in all of them, the CCRC dismissed constitutional complaints and 
upheld the judgments of the ordinary courts, convicting the applicants of abusing 
the right to freedom of expression. This suggests that the CCRC has a narrower 
scope of freedom of expression than the CCRS and the ECtHR, or that in the case 
law we analysed, it did not deal with any case in which it should have ruled accord-
ing to the standards set out in the ECtHR case law in favour of the holder of freedom 
of expression. Which of these possibilities is correct cannot be determined based 
only on the analysis of the cited decisions of the CCRC. Critically analysing the 
CCRC decisions could only be feasible if we had at our disposal the texts of the 
constitutional complaints, which were brought in some cases and which allowed us 
to infer how the constitutional complainants argued their claims that the ordinary 
courts had wrongfully limited their right to freedom of expression. The constitu-
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tional complainants’ statements are only briefl y summarised in the CCRC decisions. 
Based on the material available, we focused mainly on the question of whether the 
CCRC takes ECtHR case law into account in its decisions, according to which mat-
ters in the public interest are subject to a wide margin of freedom of expression.
After reviewing the decisions, we found that in none of these cases did the CCRC 
establish that the constitutional complainant’s statement fell within the context of 
the debate on matters in the public interest, which would justify a wide margin of 
freedom of expression. Only in one case25 did the CCRC state that the constitu-
tional complainant exceeded the permissible margin of freedom of expression, de-
spite the ‘importance’ of the information to the public, because he wrote about a 
politician’s life. From this decision, it cannot be discerned why the word ‘impor-
tance’ was used in quotation marks or whether the CCRC thus wanted to claim that 
reporting on a politician’s life is in fact not important to the public.
In no other decision did the CCRC mention whether controversial expression of the 
constitutional complainant fell within the context of the debate in the public interest, 
which is surprising given the fact that in some cases considered by the CCRC, those 
matters were undoubtedly relevant to the public.
Thus, in the case of U-III-237/2012, the CCRC dismissed a complainant who drew 
attention in a newspaper article to alleged corrupt conduct of a state prosecutor’s 
offi ce in Zadar, which is certainly a matter in the public interest. From the CCRC 
decision, it follows that the constitutional complainant could have been relieved of 
his responsibility if he submitted a fi nal conviction of the prosecutors he wrote 
about. Let us in this context recall the judgment in Thorgeirson v. Iceland mentioned 
above, in which the ECtHR stated that journalists reporting on abuses of govern-
ment representatives could use sharp and even offensive words, and their fi ndings 
may even be based solely on assumptions and hearsay. Therefore, the CCRC in the 
present case put on the constitutional complainant a signifi cantly harsher burden of 
proving the veracity of his allegations, as the Icelandic courts should have imposed 
on Thorgeirson, according to the ECtHR. Although, as mentioned above, we cannot 
accurately and comprehensively learn about the facts in that case solely on the basis 
of the CCRC decision, the above statements seem to demonstrate that the CCRC in 
the case described assessed freedom of expression more restrictively than the 
ECtHR in its case law.
As stated in the description of CCRS case law, a case of insulting a state prosecutor 
was also dealt with by the CCRS.26 One of the reasons for the CCRS’s decision, 
under which offensive words directed at the state prosecutor are within a permissi-
ble margin of freedom of expression, is that the Parliament member discussed a 
matter that was important for the public. However, the CCRC in its decision did not 
consider the question of whether the disputed statements by the constitutional com-
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plainant had been given in the context of a matter in the public interest and, if this 
were the case, whether and how the above fact infl uences defi ning the margins of 
freedom of expression of the constitutional complainant. In its decision, the CCRC 
referred to the judgment of the ECtHR De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium27 (the deci-
sion, clearly in error, states that it is the case Haas and Gijsels v. Belgium), but the 
facts of the ECtHR judgment and those of the case considered by the CCRC are 
substantially different. The case of De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium dealt with an 
insult to judges, and the case adjudicated by the CCRC dealt with an insult to pros-
ecutors. According to the settled ECtHR case law, judges should enjoy signifi cantly 
greater protection against unjustifi ed attacks on their reputation, as is the case for 
civil servants.28 In criticising prosecutors, there should therefore be a wider margin 
of freedom of expression, as with the critique of court, and that is why the case De 
Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium does not speak in favour of fi nding that the CCRC’s 
decision was consistent with ECtHR case law.
A matter in the public interest could have been involved in the case of U-
III-7479/2014. In this case, in the proceedings before ordinary courts, the constitu-
tional complainant had been sentenced for insulting the Croatian Composers’ As-
sociation. He published an advertisement accusing the plaintiff of ‘robbing’ the 
public, who was, according to the Copyright Act, entitled to a percentage of the 
price of auditory media. The CCRC dismissed the constitutional complaint and 
stated in its decision that it fully agreed with the ordinary courts. Additionally, in 
this decision, the CCRC did not consider the question of whether the disputed ad-
vertisement was a matter in the public interest. Given that the constitutional com-
plainant criticised a privilege established by law of a legal person who was allowed 
to earn income at the expense of taxpayers, in our opinion, the facts in this case were 
a matter of intense public interest to be informed. However, the CCRC did not even 
mention the existence (or lack thereof) of public interest in this case.
With regard to the CCRC case law, the case of U-III-3946/2011 should also be men-
tioned. Here, the CCRC considered a case in which the constitutional complainant 
was convicted before the ordinary court for insulting the head of a municipality. In 
an article published in a newspaper in connection with the sale of land and the con-
struction of golf courses, the head of municipality was accused of a confl ict of inter-
est. For this article, the constitutional complainant was acquitted before the ordinary 
court. However, he was sentenced for stating at a panel discussion that the head of 
the municipality was a “true cockroach”. The CCRC fully agreed with the ordinary 
courts that, independent of the context in which the controversial statement was 
made, it constituted an abuse of freedom of expression.
In this respect, it should be noted that the question of the possible abuse of a higher 
municipal offi cial is a matter in the public interest, which justifi es the participants in 
39
Journalism in the Public Interest: Defi nitions and Interpretations …
the debate having a wider margin of freedom of expression for statements that “of-
fend, shaken or disturb the State or any part of society”.29 In the context of matters 
in the public interest, the ECtHR allowed offensive statements like “idiot”30 “fas-
cist”,31 and “cerebral bankrupt”.32 As evident from the CCRS case law presented 
above, the same applies to the case law of that court.33 Slovenia’s only conviction 
before the ECtHR occurred because the CCRS was in confl ict with the standards 
described in ECtHR case law due to the objectively offensive term “cerebral bank-
rupt” being taken out of the context of a matter in the public interest.34
Conclusion
Generally, scholars and professionals in journalism and law understand the public 
interest similarly. Reviewing various defi nitions indicated that (part of) journalism 
ethics literature and professional codes in particular have attempted to implement 
more extensive defi nitions, in some cases even by enumerating circumstances that 
are supposed to count as evidence of the public interest. While some attempted to be 
all-inclusive (e.g. Muller, 2014), others recognised that the public interest was not 
confi ned to what was explicitly cited (e.g. IPSO, 2016). Conversely, the legislature 
and legal theory are not inclined to embrace a single defi nition for all of the circum-
stances that may create a situation in the public interest. The described powerless-
ness in the defi nition of the public interest is understandable. Different information 
and topics that are so important to the public that they can be labelled information 
or matters within the public interest cannot be enumerated or fi rmly defi ned. Public 
interest is an open circuit of themes that can fall within a “social, economic, cul-
tural or even commercial or religious” context (Harris et al., 2009: 457).
The same conclusion can be drawn from analysing case law of the ECtHR and the 
CCRS, while the available CCRC case law deviates from the criteria set out in the 
ECtHR case law and, with the exception of the Mladina case, also differs from the 
positions of the CCRS. As already stated in this article, our analysis of CCRC case 
law is not thorough, as we had only its decisions at our disposal, not the constitu-
tional complaints themselves. Therefore, we could not determine whether the con-
stitutional complainants referred to the public interest, in the context of which they 
made their contested statements. However, even based on the analysed decisions, it 
can be concluded that the CCRC does not consider the public interest within which 
the statements were made as an important factor in defi ning the margins of freedom 
of expression as it applies to ECtHR case law, even though it is obligated to follow 
standards set by ECtHR case law due to Croatia’s ratifi cation of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights.
We believe that it is unreasonable to expect scholars, professionals, and legislators 
to rigorously defi ne public interest in order to direct journalists’ decisions, as such a 
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defi nition could never suit every circumstance unless it was very vague. Our re-
search confi rmed that the existing defi nitions and interpretations offer suffi cient 
guidance and provide solid ground for journalists’ decision-making when consider-
ing the public interest in particular situations. The general spirit of these defi nitions 
closely relates to the idea of news media’s democratic responsibilities, which in-
clude: “informing people on factual matters relevant to their civic duties; explaining 
and clarifying those facts by putting them in context; providing a check against 
abuses of power by probing behind the curtains of government, commerce, and 
other public enterprise; and providing a venue for discussion and debate” (Scheuer, 
2008: 27). We propose a defi nition that is in line with such an understanding, but at 
the same time avoids the danger of excluding possible circumstances that can con-
tribute to the public interest:
Information in the public interest refers to data so objectively important to society 
that the public’s right to be informed about such data outweighs a human right or 
freedom, or a private or public interest, which would otherwise demand that the 
data not be disclosed to the public. Information in the public interest can be part of 
the political, economic, social, religious, or any other contexts.
This defi nition’s understanding of the public interest can be linked to Dewey’s 
(1927/1988) conceptualisation of the public in the sense of considering consequenc-
es of a particular action affecting persons beyond those involved (see Splichal, 
1999: 20). When deciding whether reporting on a particular action is in the public 
interest, a journalist should refl ect on the possible consequences of that action for 
those who are not directly involved. If the journalist fi nds that the consequences 
extend beyond those directly concerned, that they, as Dewey (1927/1988: 244) 
would say, “affect the welfare of many others”, then the action is in the public inter-
est. It should be pointed out here that the distinction between private and public is 
not the same as the one between individual and social; many private acts are social 
because “their consequences contribute to the welfare of the community or affect its 
status and prospects” (ibid.).
Going beyond a broad defi nition, such as the one written above, and searching for 
agreement on a very detailed one would be senseless and even counterproductive, 
since the variety of circumstances determining the public interest can never be pre-
dicted in advance nor written down as a comprehensive defi nition covering all pos-
sible situations. The essence of the public interest is that it concerns an important 
matter, and the matter’s importance can only be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, 
taking into account all of the circumstances of a particular case.
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Novinarstvo u javnom interesu: 





Literatura o novinarskoj etici i pravu ne sadrži općeprihvaćenu defi niciju javnog 
interesa. Cilj je ovog članka ustanoviti stajališta triju sudova o javnom interesu – 
Europskog suda za ljudska prava, Ustavnog suda Republike Slovenije i Ustavnog 
suda Republike Hrvatske – da bi se utvrdilo je li sudska praksa pružila konkretnije 
smjernice za razumijevanje stvarnog značenja novinarstva u javnom interesu. Na 
temelju naše analize predlažemo široku defi niciju u kojoj se informacije od javnog 
interesa odnose na podatke koji su toliko objektivno važni društvu da pravo javnosti 
da bude informirano o tim podatcima nadilazi ljudsko pravo ili slobodu, ili privatni 
ili javni interes, koji bi inače zahtijevali da se podatci javno ne objave. Informacije 
od javnog interesa mogu biti dio političkog, gospodarskog, društvenog, vjerskog ili 
nekog drugog konteksta. Bit je javnog interesa da se radi o važnom pitanju, čija se 
važnost može jedino vrednovati na razini pojedinačnog slučaja uzimajući u obzir 
sve okolnosti određenog slučaja. 
Ključne riječi:  novinarstvo, javni interes, Europski sud za ljudska prava, Ustavni 
sud, novinarska etika
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